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Abstract
In the late ￿ 90s Kiyotaki and Moore (KM) put forward a new framework
(Kiyotaki and Moore,1997) to explore the Financial Accelerator hypothe-
sis. The original model was framed in an In￿nitely Lived Agent context
(ILA-KM economy). As in KM we develop a dynamic model in which the
durable asset (￿land￿ ) is not only an input but also collateralizable wealth
to secure lenders from the risk of borrowers￿ default. In this paper, however,
we model an OLG-KM economy whose novel feature is the role of money as
a store of value and of bequest as a vehicle of resources to be "invested" in
landholding. The dynamics generated by the model are complex. Not only
cyclical patterns are routinely generated but the periodicity and amplitude
are irregular. A route to chaotic dynamics is open.
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11. Introduction
In the late ￿ 90s Kiyotaki and Moore (KM hereafter) put forward a new framework
to explore the Financial Accelerator hypothesis, i. e. the idea that ￿nancial
factors a⁄ect investment and output (Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997, 2002). In their
model the borrowers￿￿nancial constraint plays a crucial role. The constraint is
due to the fact that lenders extend credit only up to the present value of borrowers￿
future collateralizable wealth, which is proxied by land. In a KM economy, in fact,
land is at the same time an input and a real asset which can be collateralized to
secure lenders from the risk of borrowers￿ default. The market value of land, in
turn, depends on the future price of land, i.e. on the future asset price. The novel
and appealing feature of their model therefore is a ￿dynamic feedback process
between asset prices and borrowing constraints￿(Kasa, 1998, p. 17, emphasis
added): booming asset prices relax borrowing constraints and boost economic
activity, driving the expansion; the upswing, in turn, a⁄ects asset prices.
The KM framework is the natural vehicle to study the transmission of shocks
through net worth (balance sheet channel): ￿The dynamic interaction between
credit limits and asset prices turns out to be a powerful transmission mechanism
by which the e⁄ects of shocks persist, amplify and spread out￿ (Kiyotaki and
Moore, 1997:212). However, since all the variables are measured in real terms ￿
an odd and counterfactual feature for a model of a credit economy ￿the framework
is not suitable to study the e⁄ects of nominal shocks, such as a monetary injection.
Thanks to the dynamic feedback of asset prices and borrowing constraints, the
KM framework has gained the reputation of being particularly suitable to explore
the intertwined dynamics of asset prices and aggregate output. Open economy
variants of such a model have been adopted to study the twin crises, i.e. the
currency and ￿nancial crises which hit the Far East (Edison et al. 1998, Kasa,
1998). More recently, the same framework has been applied to an empirical study
of the US and Europe (Iacoviello, 2005a,b).
In the original framework, KM consider an economy populated by in￿nitely
lived agents, which will be referred to hereafter as a ILA-KM economy. The
reduced form of the model boils down to the law of motion of the borrowers￿
landholding (which determines aggregate output and asset prices in real terms).
KM use a linearized version of the law of motion to assess the dynamic impact of
productivity shocks according to the impulse-propagation approach. In a sense,
therefore, they are exploring ￿uctuations due to borrowing constraints. The
evocative term ￿credit cycles￿in the title of the 1997 paper sounds inappropriatebecause the model does not yield self-sustained oscillations. In fact the non linear
law of motion yields trajectories not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from those obtained by
a linear law.
In an appendix, KM sketch the building blocks of an overlapping generations
variant of their model along the lines of Blanchard￿ s ￿￿nite horizon￿framework
(Blanchard 1985). This suggestion has been followed by Kasa (1998). The dynam-
ics, however, are not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from that of the original KM frame-
work.
To the best of our knowledge, no other attempt has been made to develop an
OLG framework of a KM economy. In this paper we model an OLG-KM economy
￿ la Diamond-Samuelson with money and bequest. In our framework nominal
variables play a crucial role. Money is essentially a store of value, which allows
to access consumption and leave a bequest when old. The dynamics generated by
the OLG-KM model are much richer than the dynamics of the original framework.
In the present model, not only cyclical patterns are routinely generated ￿so that
in this context the expression credit cycles deserves a mention in the title1 ￿but
the periodicity and amplitude are irregular. A route to chaotic dynamics is open.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present a quick refresher
course on ILA-KM economies. Section 3 is devoted to the background assumptions
concerning our OLG-KM economy. The optimization problems of the farmer and
the gatherer are discussed in sections 4 and 5 respectively. The analytical details
are con￿ned in the appendix A. A discussion of the economic content of these
optimization problems is conducted in section 6. Section 7 describes the trickling
down process by which money spreads in the economy and is carried out from one
period to the next by means of exchanges and bequests. Section 8 is devoted to
the dynamics. Section 9 concludes.
2. A quick refresher course on ILA-KM economies
KM assume that in a principal-agent relationship between borrowers and lenders,
characterized by asymmetric information and moral hazard, borrowers face a ￿-
nancing constraint: the loan they get is smaller or equal to the value of their
collateralizable assets, which play, in this framework a role analogous to that of
net worth or the equity base in Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993) and entrepreneurs￿
savings (internal ￿nance) in Bernanke and Gertler (1989, 1990).
1Cordoba e Ripoll (2004) obtain credit cycles in a ILA-KM economy with a cash in advance
constraint.KM assume that in￿nitely lived agents can be either ￿nancially constrained
borrowers (￿farmers￿ ) or lenders (￿gatherers￿ ). A farmer is an agent endowed with
inalienable human capital. Therefore, he can get from lenders no more than the
value of his collateralizable assets. This is the reason of the ￿nancing constraint.2
A gatherer, on the contrary, does not face ￿nancing constraints.
There are two types of goods, output (￿fruit￿ ) and a collateralizable, durable,
non-reproducible asset (￿land￿ ) whose total supply is ￿xed ( ￿ K). Output can be
consumed or lent. If lent, each unit of output yields a constant return R = 1 + r
where r is the real interest rate. Output is produced by means of a technology
which uses land and labour.
By assumption farmers and gatherers have access to di⁄erent technologies.
The production function of each farmer is: yF
t = (a+￿ c)KF
t￿1 where yF
t is output
of the farmer in t, a;￿ c are positive technological parameters and KF
t￿1 is land of
the farmer in t ￿ 1. ￿ cKF
t￿1 is the output which deteriorates (￿bruised fruit￿ ) and
is therefore non-tradable.
The technology of the farmer is idiosyncratic in the sense that once produc-
tion has started only the farmer has the skills to complete the production process
successfully, i.e. to make land bears fruit. If the farmer withdrew his labour, pro-
duction would not be carried out, i.e. land would bear no fruit. As a consequence,
if the farmer goes into debt, he may have an incentive to threaten his creditors
to withdraw his labour and repudiate debt. Creditors protect themselves against
this threat by collateralizing the farmer￿ s land. This is the reason why the farmer






According to (1), the maximum amount of debt a farmer succeeds to get
￿today￿bt is such that the sum of principal and interest Rbt is equal to the value
of the farmer￿ s land when the debt is due, i.e. qt+1KF
t where qt+1 is the (real)
price of land at time t + 1.
The farmer faces also a ￿ow-of-funds constraint:
y
F








t is the farmer￿ s consumption. Substituting (1) into (2) we get:
c
F





2On this issue see Hart and Moore (1994, 1998).where ￿t = qt ￿
qt+1
R
is the downpayment, i.e. the amount the farmer has to put
aside as internal ￿nance to acquire one unit of land.
Preferences are modelled in such a way that farmers consume only non-tradable
output, i.e. cF
t = ￿ cKF






i. e. the revenues obtained by selling (non-bruised) fruit are employed as down-

































of the gatherer in t , G(:) is a well behaved production function and KG
t￿1 is land
of the gatherer in t ￿ 1. The gatherer faces only a ￿ow-of-funds constraint:
y
G




t￿1) + bt + c
G
t (7)
Substituting the production function of the gatherer and the ￿nancing con-
straint of the farmer into (7) and assuming, for the sake of simplicity and without
loss of generality, that population consists only of one farmer and one gatherer so
that KF
t = ￿ K ￿ KG











From maximization of the utility of the gatherer one gets G0(KG
t ) = R￿t.
Since the total amount of land is ￿xed by assumption, KF
t = ￿ K ￿KG





G0 ￿ ￿ K ￿ KF
t
￿
. In the following, in order to save on notation, we will write



























t￿1 (10)(10) is a non-linear di⁄erence equation in the state variable KF
t .
Denoting with a star the steady state value of a variable, plugging the steady
state condition KF
t = KF





















and Rb￿ = a
RK￿
R ￿ 1
= q￿K￿: In the steady state from (2) we infer
s￿F = aK￿F = rb￿ where r = R ￿ 1. In words, in the steady state the farmer
saves and sells all the tradable output to obtain resources which are used to pay
the interest on debt. The principal is never paid back. Debt is rolled over period





is constant and equal
to the reciprocal of the (net) interest rate.
As to the gatherer, from (8) follows that cG
t = G( ￿ K ￿ K￿F) + aK￿F or s￿G =
￿aK￿F = rb￿. In words, in the steady state the gatherer is dissaving an amount
equal to the interest on debt. The ￿ ow of interest payments from the farmer
allows the gatherer to consume in excess of income.
KM log-linearize (10) in the neighborhood of the steady state and show that
small shocks to the technological parameter a can produce large and persistent
￿ uctuations in output and asset prices. In their model, in fact, the durable, non
reproducible asset (land) plays the dual role of a factor of production for both
constrained and unconstrained agents and of collateralizable wealth for ￿nancially
constrained agents. Therefore the price of assets a⁄ects the borrowers￿￿nancing
constraint and at the same time, the size of the borrowers￿credit limits feeds back
on asset prices.
3. An OLG-KM economy: The environment
In a OLG-KM economy in each period there are four classes of agents. In order
to simplify matters, we normalize the population in each class to unity so that we
will deal in the following with a young farmer (YF), an old farmer (OF), a young
gatherer (YG) and an old gatherer (OG).
In the present context we try to reproduce as much as possible the environment
originally envisaged by KM. There are two types of goods, output (￿fruit￿ ) and
a non-reproducible asset (￿land￿ ) whose total supply is ￿xed ( ￿ K). Output is
produced by means of a technology which uses land and labour. Each young agentis endowed with one unit of labour. By assumption farmers and gatherers have
access to di⁄erent technologies. The production function of the YF is: yF
t = ￿KF
t￿1











G(:) is increasing, strictly concave and satis￿es the Inada conditions. Due to the
time lag between land use and production, the agents work when young and obtain
the fruit of their e⁄ort when old.
For the sake of simplicity we assume that agents work when young and consume
when old. Moreover, they leave a bequest to the o⁄spring when old. As usual
the bequest motive is rooted in intergenerational altruism. We assume also that
money provides speci￿c utility to the young agent. The marginal utility of money















t;t+1 is consumption of the agent of type i and generation t in t+1, ai
t+1 is





are real money balances of the agent of of type i and generation t in t:
4. The farmer/borrower
For simplicity we assume that the utility function is separable, we adopt a Cobb-
Douglas speci￿cation for consumption and bequest and a linear speci￿cation for
money in the utility function. Preferences of the farmer are represented by
U
F = ￿ lnc
F






where 0 < ￿ < 1, ￿F > 0:3The farmer maximizes (11) subject to three con-
straints: the ￿ ow-of-funds (FF) constraint of the YF, the FF constraint of the
OF and the ￿nancing constraint. From optimization it turns out that all the
constraints are binding (see the appendix A).











t;t = bt + a
F
t (12)
3In the case of bequest, the notation is unambiguous. The bequest left by the agent of
generation t in t+1 (i.e. when old) to his child can be denoted by aF
t;t+1: The bequest received
by agent of generation t+1 in t+1 (i.e. when young) is aF
t+1;t+1: Of course the two notions






is the real price of land; bt is credit and aF
t is bequest, i.e. wealth
inherited by the YF. According to (12), the resources of the YF, of internal or ex-
ternal origin (aF






￿i.e. to change the farmer￿ s landholding ￿and accumulate money balances.
Since the young does not derive utility from consumption, the YF carries
money over from youth to old age in order to use it as a means of payment in
the second stage of his life. Notice that the agent can consume (and leave as a
bequest) the output that he obtains from working when young ￿net of interest
payments to the gatherer ￿because it takes one period for land to produce output.
Strictly speaking therefore money is not absolutely necessary to make consumption
possible when old. Money only allows to increase consumption (and bequest) when
old over and above the level made possible by production alone.
The YF borrows from the YG. Being endowed with inalienable human capital,
the former can get a loan equal at most to the value of collateralizable assets, i.e.








where R is the real (gross) interest rate and qt+1 is the real price of land in the
future which we assume is known in advance (perfect foresight).
In t, the YF uses labour and land KF
t to produce output which will become
available in t + 1. When old, the farmer￿ s resources eF
t+1 consist of output yF
t+1 =
￿KF






























where ￿t = qt ￿
qt+1
R
is the downpayment. Equation (15) provides a di⁄erent
interpretation of the FF constraint of the YF. The farmer￿ s wealth aF
t + qtKF
t￿1
can be employed as downpayment or held as money balances to be employed in
old age. If the YF did not hold money, he could put aside a higher downpayment,
obtain more land and produce more: Money holding has a crowding out e⁄ect on










Money carried over from young age increases resources of the old farmer. The
e⁄ort to put aside money when young pays o⁄in old age because it adds resources
to those already available to the old for consumption and bequest.
The RHS, i.e. (￿ ￿ qt+1)KF
t +mF
t;t+1 is the equation of the resources of the old
eF
t+1 once one takes into account the fact that the ￿nancing constraint is binding.
Absent money mF
t;t+1, the following condition should be imposed: ￿ > qt+1: In the








From the focs and the constraints it is easy to conclude that, thanks to the
Cobb-Douglas speci￿cation of preferences, consumption and bequest are a fraction




























Notice now that from (18) follows that the optimal bequest of the OF of
generation t ￿ 1 in t is:
a
F













are real money balances of the OF of generation t￿1 in t.




[(1 ￿ ￿)￿ + ￿qt]KF





which is the law of motion of the land of the farmer.
There are two di⁄erences with respect to the law of motion of the farmer￿ s
landholding in an ILA-KM economy. First, the dependence of KF
t on KF
t￿1 is






￿ ￿ ￿ ￿OLG =







￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ILA =
￿
￿t






in the OLG-KM case is a weighted average of qt and ￿.
Second, in the OLG-KM case the law of motion of KF
t depends also on money
balances mF
t￿1;t and mF
t;t. Money has two di⁄erent and contrasting e⁄ects on
landholding:
1. given the bequest, the higher is money of the young mF
t;t, the lower land-
holding: In fact resources of the young (bequest and credit) can be devoted
either to money or landholding;
2. the higher is money of the old mF
t￿1;t, the higher resources available to him
and the higher bequest the old leaves to the young. This bequest, in turn,
is employed by the young to expand landholding.
Let￿ s focus now on the way in which real money balances change over time.
Following the usual modelling procedure, we conceive of money injections as mon-
etized transfers from the public sector to the old agents. Therefore nominal money
balances of the i-th agent when old Mi
t;t+1 are equal to the sum of money carried
on from youth Mi
t;t and of subsidies T i
t+1. Moreover, we assume that these trans-












t+1 is the rate of growth of money supply for the
i-th agent. In our framework there are only two agents (a farmer and a gatherer),


























represents the (gross) rate of change of real money balances.
The expression (1 ￿ ￿)mF
t￿1;t ￿ mF























[(1 ￿ ￿)￿ + ￿qt]KF
t￿1 ￿
￿











4Of course ￿t+1 =
1
1 + ￿t+1
where ￿t+1 is the in￿ ation rate.The ￿rst e⁄ect prevails ￿so that all in all an increase in money balances brings





￿t+1 < (1 ￿ ￿)
￿1 : In the following






￿t+1 = 1: In this case, the ￿rst e⁄ect prevails.
5. The gatherer/lender
Following the same modelling strategy of the previous section, we assume that
preferences of the gatherer are represented as follows
U
G = ￿ lnc
G








t+1 are consumption and bequest of the OG, mG
t;t are real
money balances of the YG, ￿G > 0: Being unconstrained from the ￿nancial point
of view, the gatherer maximizes utility subject to the FF constraints of the YG
and of the OG. All the constraints are binding (see the appendix A).
The FF constraint of the YG in t is
m
G











According to (22), the resources of the YG which coincide with bequest (aG
t ) can






, extend credit and hold money balances.
If the YG did not put aside some money in order to employ it in the future ￿
i.e. to increase his resources when old ￿he could invest more in land and produce
more or lend more.
In t, the YG uses labour and land KG
t to produce output which will become






. When old, the gatherer￿ s resources consist of








t;t+1. These resources can be employed
to consume and leave a bequest. Therefore the FF constraint of the OG in t + 1











+ Rbt + m
G
t;t+1 (23)






. Recalling that, in

















(24)We will refer to (24) in the following as the asset price equation.
Since the ￿nancing constraint is binding, the amount of credit extended by













t;t+1 once one takes into account the fact that the




t+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)eG
t+1. Thanks to the Cobb-Douglas
speci￿cation of prefences, consumption and bequest are a fraction ￿ and 1 ￿ ￿



































6. On money, land and debt
In order to understand the basic features of the present model, it may be useful
to go back to the original ILA-KM economy for a comparison. In the original
setting, the farmer may be thought of as maximizing a generic intertemporal











+ ::: subject to the FF constraint (2),
i.e. yF
t + bt ￿ qt(KF
t ￿ KF
t￿1) + Rbt￿1 + cF





























t+1R = ￿t > 0
where ￿
F is the Lagrange multiplier concerning the FF constraint and ￿ is the
Lagrange multiplier associated with the ￿nancing constraint. Substituting the















If inequality (27) is satis￿ed, the ￿nancing constraint is binding ￿i.e. ￿t > 0.
This condition may be interpreted as follows. Suppose the farmer obtains one
unit of fruit from the gatherer as a new loan and increases consumption in period





other hand, he has to give back R > 1 units of fruit to the gatherer in period t+1to reimburse debt. The marginal utility of future consumption the farmer should















R, the farmer has an incentive to borrow as much
as possible, i.e. up to the limit established by the lender equal to the present value
of collateralizable wealth.




t+1. Hence the condition for a binding ￿nancing constraint becomes
1 > ￿
FR (28)
As suggested by intuition, the borrower pushes indebtedness to the limit if the
interest rate is su¢ ciently low. In this case, it has to be lower than the rate of
time preference.












+::: subject to the FF constraint (7) which, after substitution of KG
t =
K ￿ KF
t and rearrangement, can be written as yG








t . Resources consist of output yG
t , interest payments on loans extended in the
past Rbt￿1 = qtKF
t￿1 and the revenues from the sale of land to the farmer which






. Funds can be used to
consume cG




























































the gatherer obtains from increasing current con-
sumption by one unit as a consequence of reducing the amount of loans extended
to the farmer by the same amount must be equal to the present value of the mar-






R.In the original ILA-KM framework, the felicity function is linear. Hence equa-
tion (29) boils down to
1 = ￿
GR (30)





which is a restatement of the assumption of preference heterogeneity characterizing
the framework put forward by KM.

























In order to interpret (31) suppose the gatherer sells one unit of land to the
farmer in t at the price qt. The farmer￿ s landholding increases by one unit so that
the loan the gatherer is willing to extend to the farmer goes up by qt+1=R: All in all,
the increase of resources available in t to the gatherer is equal to qt￿(qt+1=R) = ￿t
i.e. the downpayment.





in t+1. The loan made in t yields interest payments equal to R(qt+1=R) =
qt+1. On the other hand the smaller landholding in t translates into a smaller
revenue from the sale of land in t + 1 equal to qt+1.5 Interest payments o⁄set the
reduction of revenues from the sale of land so that, all in all, the e⁄ect of selling one
unit of land in t on resources available in t+1 to the gatherer boils down to the loss




. In the optimum, the marginal utility of increased consumption








must be equal to the present value of marginal disutility









as stated in (31).








Let￿ s consider now a generic OLG-KM economy. In this setting the farmer







subject to the FF constraints when young and
5In fact the farmer￿ s landholding goes up by one unit in t so that the farmer￿ s investment in






goes down by the same amount, coeteris paribus. Therefore resources
of the gatherer go down by qt+1 in t + 1.when old and to the ￿nancing constraint. The focs are































are the marginal utilities of money,
consumption (when old) and bequest (left to the o⁄spring).







￿t+1 > ucR (32)
If inequality (32) is satis￿ed, the ￿nancing constraint is binding. In order to in-






1, i.e. the rate of in￿ ation is equal to the rate of growth of money supply of the
farmer. Therefore real money balances are constant: mF
t+1 = mF
t . Thanks to this
assumption inequality (32) becomes
um + uc > ucR (33)
Suppose the young farmer obtains a new loan consisting of one unit of fruit and
increases money holding in period t by the same amount6. In our setting additional
money yields an increase in utility both in youth and in old age. The ￿rst e⁄ect
is captured by the term um, the marginal utility the farmer gets from increasing
money holding mF
t by one unit when young. The second e⁄ect is due to the fact
that an increase in money balances in youth carried over to old age adds to the
resources available to the farmer when old: Storing value by means of money
allows the old farmer to increase consumption and bequest. The marginal utility
















t+1 ￿ Rbt and mF
t+1 = mF
t .
Hence the LHS of (33) is the total increase in utility due to an increase in money
holding by one unit when the farmer is young.
On the other hand, the farmer has to give back R > 1 units of fruit to the
gatherer when old to reimburse debt. The marginal utility of future consumption
6By assumption consumption when young does not yield utility. Therefore, the additional







= ucR. Inequality (33)
states that the ￿nancing constraint is binding if the marginal utility um + uc the
farmer obtains from increasing money holding by one unit as a consequence of
increasing debt by the same amount when young is greater than the marginal
utility of consumption ucR the farmer should give up because he has to reimburse
debt when old7. In this case the farmer has an incentive to get as much debt as
he can.
Notice that (33) can be written as
um > uc (R ￿ 1) (34)
where R￿1 > 0. If there were no e⁄ect on utility of money holding when young,
i.e. um = 0, the condition for a binding ￿nancing constraint would never be
satis￿ed because ucR > uc. An increase of one unit of money when young, in
fact, would yield additional utility uc when old since it would increase resources
devoted to consumption (or bequest). This increase in utility, however, would
always be smaller that the reduction of utility ucR the farmer would su⁄er in
order to reimburse debt. In the presence of debt, money would not be held in
portfolios even if it allowed to store "value" for future consumption (or bequest)
simply because it would be "too expensive" in terms of forgone consumption to
get a new loan to hold money.
A necessary condition for money to be held in portfolios by rational farmers
when young, therefore, is um > 0. This is the reason why money shows up in (11).
Therefore the present model belongs to the class of OLG models with Money in
the Utility Function. To the best of our knowledge there are relatively few models
in this class. A remarkable example is the framework put forward by L. Weiss
(1980).



































7For simplicity, the discount factor is implicitly set to unity.










= uaIn words, the (constant) marginal utility of money should be greater than a thresh-
old level ^ ￿
F which in turn is a function, among other things, of the price of land,
the farmer￿ s landholding and the young farmer￿ s money balances. In the following
we assume that this condition is satis￿ed.








subject to the FF constraints when young and when old.
The focs are



























are the marginal utilities of consumption (when
old) and bequest (left to the o⁄spring) for the gatherer.








The interpretation of (35) is as follows. Suppose the young gatherer sells one
unit of land in t at the price qt. The young farmer￿ s landholding increases by
one unit so that the loan the gatherer extends to the farmer goes up by qt+1=R.
All in all, the increase of resources available to the gatherer when young is equal
to qt ￿ (qt+1=R) = ￿t, i.e. the downpayment. The marginal impact of this in-
crease of resources in t on the objective function is ￿t￿t = ucR[qt ￿ (qt+1=R)] =
uc (Rqt ￿ qt+1).





in t+1. The loan made in t yields interest payments equal to R(qt+1=R) =
qt+1. Therefore, selling one unit of land in t leads to a reduction of resources in t+1




￿qt+1. The marginal impact of this decrease of resources in t+1

















. From this condition we get (35).
Notice that in (35) the present value of the marginal productivity of land is
equal to the asset price and not to the downpayment.7. Money ￿ ows
Since the total amount of land is ￿xed by assumption an increase of landholding
for the farmer can occur only if there is a corresponding decrease of landholding








. Taking this fact into account,











In words: the total amount of bequest obtained by the young agents is equal to
the total amount of money of the young agents. In the special case in which the













The polar opposite case in which investment is ￿nanced exlusively by internal







t so that mF
t;t = bt.
In any case both money and bequests are necessary ingredients of the model.




























In words: the sum of aggregate output and real money balances of the old agents
is equal to the sum of aggregate consumption and aggregate bequest.




















i.e. the total amount of bequest left by the old agents is equal to the total amount









t+1;t+1In words, money of the old agents should be equal to money of the young
agents in each period.
In our economy money "trickles down" from one period to the next and from
one agent to the other. In fact a network of money transfers is taking place from
the pool of monetary resources of one agent to the pool of another agent. In
principle we distinguish two types of transfers among private agents:
￿ "within generations" or horizontal transfers, i.e. transfers between agents of
the same generation but of di⁄erent types (farmers and gatherers). Horizon-
tal transfers are the monetary counterpart of transactions between agents
of di⁄erent types concerning goods (fruit) or land. Therefore they are moti-
vated by agents￿decisions to consume and invest, i.e. modify landholdings;
￿ "between generations" or vertical transfers, i.e. transfers between agents of
di⁄erent generations but of the same type (old and young agents). Vertical
transfers coincides with bequests, which are motivated by intergenerational
altruism;
In order to describe the way in which money ￿ ows in the economy, let￿ s take
a look at table 1. In each row we report the in￿ ows and out￿ ows which show up
in the FF constraints of the agents in period t+1. The amount in the in￿ ow cell
is equal to the amount in the out￿ ow cell. For instance, the ￿rst row represents
the FF constraint of the YF in t + 1. In other words, we have rewritten in a
suitable form equation (12). The third row is the sum of rows 1 and 2 (concerning
young agents), the sixth row is the sum of rows 4 and 5 (concerning old agents).
Therefore, the table contains equations (12), (22), (37), (14), (23) and (38).
inf lows out￿ ows
Y F aF










































Let￿ s assume that yF
t+1 ￿ cF
t;t+1 = sF
t;t+1 > 0, i.e. the OF consumes less than
the output he has produced. In a sense he is "saving" the amount sF




















The OF sells sF
t;t+1 units of output to the OG in order to let him consume in
excess of his output. The OG pays this output by means of money. Therefore,








This money is used to reimburse debt btR to the OG and leave the bequest aF
t+1









t+1 + btR which is the FF of the OF.
The YF receives aF
t+1 from OF and bt+1 from the YG and employs these re-






and hold money balances. Notice that,
since aF









t+1;t+1 = [(1 ￿ ￿)￿ + ￿qt+1]K
F





This equation links the money of the young farmer of generation t + 1 to the








































t;t+1. In words, the farmer of
generation t when young (old) holds the same money balances in real terms of the
farmer of generation t￿1 when young (old) or the son has the same money balances













this case we can simplify notation writing mF















￿t+1. The same applies to the gatherer. In the











i.e. the steady state. This case means that (i) the rate of growth of the money
supply for each and every agent is the same, i.e. the ratio of the two types ofmoney is constant, (ii) the rate of change of prices is equal to the rate of change
of money.
Alternatively one can think that mF
t￿1;t = mF
t;t. In words, the farmer of gen-
eration t when young holds the same money balances in real terms of the farmer
of generation t-1 when old or the son has the same money balances of the father.







t;t. We can simplify notation writing
mF








t : Only in case ￿i
t+1 = ￿t+1 we
get the same result as before so that
s
F = (R ￿ 1)b
as in KM-ILA. This means that only the case of a positive farmer￿ s saving can be
true in the steady state.
Thanks to the Cobb-Douglas speci￿cation of the utility function, from the








t+1 i = F;G (42)
















Total real money balances are proportional to aggregate output. Equation (43) is























































is the ratio of the money of the gatherer to the money of
the farmer (money ratio for short). This ratio is constant i⁄ ￿G
t+1 = ￿F
t+1.8. Dynamics
The dynamics of the macroeconomy are described by equation (19), i.e the law
of motion of the farmer￿ s land, equation (24), i.e. the asset price equation, and
equation (43), i.e. the quantity theory of money.
Let￿ s assume ￿i
t+1 = ￿t+1 so that (1 ￿ ￿)mF
t￿1;t ￿ mF
t;t = ￿￿mF
t . We list the
equations below for the reader￿ s convenience.
KF
t =




















￿ ￿ K ￿ KF
t￿1
￿￿













































































which is a non linear second order di⁄erence equation in the state variable KF
t in
implicit form.
Let￿ s assume ￿ = ￿0. In the steady state KF
t = KF
t￿1 = KF and qt = qt+1 = q
so that ￿t = ￿ with ￿ = q" with " = 1 ￿
1
R
. In the steady state, therefore, the



























< 0. (47) is a system of two equations which can be solved for
the steady state values of in KFand q: The second equation yields a decreasing
relationship between q and KF. On the other hand, from the ￿rst equation it is





plane depending upon the relative value of ￿ and ". In
the case ￿ > " (respectively: ￿ < "), the curve is downward (upward) sloping. In
both cases, the curve crosses the x-axis when KF
c = h￿1 (￿0￿). The steady state
is unique if the curve is downward sloping; there can be more than one steady
state in the opposite case.
In order to assess the properties of the trajectories generated by this system,
we have to specify the gatherer￿ s production function. We assume G




￿ K ￿ KF
t .
The system is characterized by 5 parameters: the scale of the economy ￿ K, the
preference parameter ￿, the productivity of the farmer￿ s land ￿, the money ratio
￿, the real interest rate R. Depending upon the con￿guration of parameters, we
can have di⁄erent dynamic patterns and properties of equilibria.
In ￿gure 1, left panel, for instance, we have a unique steady state E￿. The
white region is the basin of attraction of E￿. Trajectories originating in points in
the grey region diverge.
Other things being equal, when ￿ goes up an attracting closed curve ￿ emerges
(￿gure 1 right panel), as a consequence of a supercritical Neimark-Sacker bifurca-
tion of the steady state E￿. Once again, the white region is the basin of attraction
of the closed curve ￿. Trajectories originating in points in the grey region diverge.
Quasi periodic or aperiodic orbits emerge when the system ￿circles￿ along the
curve.
As often occurs in nonlinear models, coexistence of attractors and complex
dynamics are possible outcomes. A possible route is shown in the next ￿gures.
In Fig.2, the attracting closed curve ￿ coexists with a stable cycle C of period 6.
The light grey points denote the basin of attraction of the cycle C. Observe that
the curve ￿ is very close to the boundary of its basin of attraction.Figure 1: Left panel: unique steady state E￿. Right panel: closed curve ￿
As ￿ is slightly increased, ￿ disappears via contact bifurcation, and the long-
run behavior of the bounded trajectories is given by a 6-piece chaotic attractor,
obtained through a sequence of period doubling bifurcations of the cycle of period
6.
After a sequence of homoclinic bifurcations, a (one-piece) strange attractor
appears (Fig.3). Once more, it is very close to its basin boundary. This means
that a further increase of ￿ will cause a second contact bifurcation, whose e⁄ect is
the desappearance of the attractor and the divergence of the generic trajectories.
The sequence just illustrated is typical of this model, occurring at di⁄erent
parameter con￿gurations. In the last ￿gure, we show the stability region of E￿ in
the parameter space (￿;￿). We may observe that the Neimark-Sacker bifurcation
curve establishes a decreasing relationship between ￿ and ￿ and that the stability
region shrinks as R increases (Fig.4).
In order to interpret the consequences of a change in the stance of monetary
policy, let￿ s assume, for the sake of discussion, that the rate of change of money is
uniform across agents and equal to the rate of in￿ ation, i.e. ￿F
0 = ￿G
0 = ￿0 = ￿0.Figure 2: Left panel stable cicle C. Right panel: 6 piece chaotic attractor.
Let the money ratio be ￿0. Suppose now that the rate of change of money supply
goes up and is still uniform across agents, i.e. ￿F
1 = ￿G
1 = ￿1. In this case, the
money ratio does not change so that also KF and mF will not change. The e⁄ect
of such a move is to increase the rate of in￿ ation to ￿1 = ￿1. The real interest






but the nominal interest rate goes
up in the same proportion as the in￿ ation rate.
Suppose now that the central bank adopts a di⁄erentiated policy move. For
instance the rate of growth of money of the gatherer becomes ￿G
1 > ￿0 while the
rate of growth of money of the farmer remains unchanged ￿F
0 = ￿0. The money
ratio goes up to ￿1 and stays there even if the rate of growth of money of the
gatherer goes down to ￿0 thereafter. After the shock, therefore, the in￿ ation rate
goes back to ￿0. Due to the (permanent) change of the money ratio ￿ the dynamics
of the model change dramatically as shown above. We can draw therefore the
following conclusion
Remark 1. If a policy move does not change the money ratio ￿, i.e. if theFigure 3: One piece strange attractor
central bank changes the rates of growth of the monetary aggregates of the farmer
and the gatherer by the same amount, monetary policy is superneutral, i.e. the
allocation of land to the farmer and the gatherer does not change, real variables
are una⁄ected and the only e⁄ect of the policy move is an increase in the rate
of in￿ ation, which is pinned down to the (uniform) rate of change of money. If,
on the other hand, the move is di⁄erentiated, i.e. the rates of growth of the
two monetary aggregates are heterogeneous ￿albeit temporarily ￿￿ changes and
monetary policy is not superneutral, i.e. the allocation of land changes and real
variables are permanently a⁄ected, even if the rates of growth of the two aggregates
go back to the original value afterwards.
9. Conclusions
In this paper we have presented and discussed an OLG model of an economy
characterized by ￿nancing constraints ￿ la Kiyotaki and Moore. We adopt aFigure 4: Neimark-Sacker bifurcations
Diamond-Samuelson approach, a strategy not followed in the literature, which
has explored only the case of a Blanchard-Yaari framework to model the ￿nancial
accelerator with overlapping generations (Kasa, 1998).
In this setting we explore the properties of the dynamical two-dimensional
system generated by the model. Without imposing ad-hoc non-linearities, we get
a straightforward route to complex dynamics.
Changes in the rate of growth of money supply can have real e⁄ects if the
central bank changes also the allocation of money to the two types of agents. If
monetary policy moves do not in￿ uence the allocation of money, also the allocation
of land ￿and therefore aggregate output ￿will be una⁄ected and money will turn
out to be superneutral.A. Optimization
In the following we will denote magnitudes at current (constant) prices with capital
(small) letters.
Let￿ s examine ￿rst the optimization problem of the farmer. The young farmer
(YF) is endowed at birth with bequest AF
t . He employs the bequest and credit Bt






and hold money balances MF
t;t. The ￿ ow-of-funds











t;t ￿ Bt + A
F
t































The YF is ￿nancially coinstrained. The ￿nancing constraint in nominal terms







where it is the nominal interest rate. Multiplying and dividing the expression







where R := (1 + it)=(1 + ￿t+1) is the real (gross) interest rate and 1 + ￿t+1 :=
Pt+1=Pt is the (gross) rate of in￿ ation. As in KM, R is given and constant9.
In t, the YF uses labour and land KF
t to produce output yF
t+1 which will become
available in t+1. When old, the farmer employs output and money balances MF
t;t+1
to reimburse debt, consume and leave a bequest. Therefore the FF constraint of





























9This assumption holds if the current nominal interest rate is adjusted for future in￿ ation as






















The farmer maximizes (11) subject to (48), (50) and (49). The Lagrangian is:
L = ￿ lnc
F












































































































> 0. Hence the FF
of the OF is binding (see (14)). Taking into account (iF), from (iiiF) follows
￿
F
















￿t+1 > 0 so that ￿
F
t > 0.
Also the FF of the YF is binding (see (12)).








so that from (ivF) follows that ￿t > 0. Therefore the ￿nancing constraint is
binding (see (13)).




t+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)eF
t+1 where eF








resources available to the OF ￿i.e. output and money less interest payments ￿














t+1In words, the marginal utility of consumption is equal to the marginal utility of
bequest and is equal to the reciprocal of the resources available to the OF.
Using the equality above, the Lagrange multiplier ￿
F

















































































The condition above ￿which implies that ￿t > 0 and the ￿nancing constraint is
binding ￿will be always satis￿ed if it ￿ ￿F
t+1 because in this case ^ ￿
F ￿ 0. On
the other hand, if it > ￿F
t+1 the marginal utility of money must be su¢ ciently
high, i.e. higher than a threshold ^ ￿




















Let￿ s consider now the gatherer￿ s optimization problem. The young gatherer
(YG) is endowed at birth with bequest AG
t which he employs to extend credit












and hold money balances
MG



























t (53)In t, the YG uses labour and land KG
t = ￿ K￿KF
t to produce output yG
t+1 which
will become available in t + 1. When old, the gatherer employs the output, the
repayment of the loan extended when young and money to consume and leave a







t+1 + Bt (1 + it) + M
G
t;t+1








































The gatherer maximizes (21) subject to (53) and (54). The Lagrangian is:
L = ￿ lnc
G







































































































> 0. Hence the FF of
the OG is binding (see equation (23)).





















R > 0Hence also the FF of the YF is binding (see equation (22)).


































equality above, the Lagrange multiplier ￿
G


















Comparing the focs of the optimization problem of the farmer with those of













































G = R. Hence this condition re￿ ected
preference heterogeneity.







Notice that we do not assume that the gatherer chooses money balances opti-














￿t+1 = 0. Taking (ivG) into account, this condition


































> 0 i.e. the gatherer holds too little money (w.r.t. the optimal money
balances) and viceversa.References
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